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The Politics of Exclusionary Zoning & the Pathology That Led to the Collapse of New 
Jersey’s Mount Laurel Mandate 
 
By Kristin Rempusheski 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 
On March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbanded the Council on Affordable 
Housing (COAH)1 in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5.97 by the New Jersey Council on 
Affordable Housing, what is now being deemed Mount Laurel IV.2  As a consequence, specially 
assigned judges now have jurisdiction over all affordable housing litigation.3  In 1975, the Mount 
Laurel sequence of cases began when the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated “exclusionary 
zoning,” which meant that municipalities could no longer use local zoning ordinances to 
effectively exclude people of low to moderate incomes from communities.4  In doing so, the 
remarkable decision expressly mandated municipalities to provide a “realistic opportunity” of 
affordable housing to all people.5  However, when the Mount Laurel mandate was widely ignored 
by municipalities, the court again heard the issue in what was coined Mount Laurel II.6  There, the 
court established a procedure by which three specially selected judges would hear all Mount Laurel 
litigation, and established strict enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.7  This 
revolutionary decision opened the floodgates to litigation, and the New Jersey legislature 
responded by enacting the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to keep the courts out of the business of 
enforcing housing obligations.8   
                                                     
1 COAH was created in 1985 by the Fair Housing Act.   
2 221 N.J. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Mount Laurel IV].  
3 See id.  
4 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, appeal dismissed and cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. 
5 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75. 
6 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 
II]. 
7 Id. at 253-54; 85-86. 
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2013).  
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As an alternative for supervision, the Act created COAH, an agency that was granted broad 
authority to oversee all affordable housing obligations.9  While this angered housing advocates 
who foresaw future noncompliance as a result of defects in the new system, the Court upheld the 
FHA and its companion agency in what was termed Mount Laurel III, and jurisdiction over all 
Mount Laurel litigation was transferred to the Council.10  However, in the years to follow, COAH’s 
own flaws became apparent, and a lack of political consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate 
enabled abrogation of the constitutional mandate at the local level.  The lack of unanimity amongst 
the branches of government essentially allowed municipalities to escape their fair share housing 
obligations, through delays and other devices.  Thus, just like in Mount Laurel II, this ultimately 
led the court to re-enter the scene and assume jurisdiction over all affordable housing litigation.  
Once again, an opening of the floodgates has ensued.   
 This Note will argue that until the other branches of government can devise an effective 
system to enforce the Mount Laurel mandate, it is necessary for the judicial branch to compel 
compliance with affordable housing obligations.  In doing so, it proceeds in four parts.  Part II 
provides a synopsis of the reasoning and background behind the Mount Laurel doctrine, as well as 
the enactment of the FHA and COAH.  Part III then explains how COAH’s own shortcomings, in 
conjunction with a lack of political consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate, ultimately 
allowed for inconsistencies amongst the three branches of state government.  It will illustrate how 
these inconsistencies ultimately led to judicial intervention, resulting in the recent Mount Laurel 
IV decision.  Finally, Part IV provides an explanation of why the Mount Laurel IV decision was 
necessary.  In doing so, it describes how the feeble administrative process and lack of political 
                                                     
9 Id. § 52:27D-329.2(a). 
10 Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 43 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III]. 
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consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate enabled municipalities to ignore the Mount Laurel 
mandate through delays and other tactics in the absence of court orders requiring compliance.  
Furthermore, it describes how allowing the judiciary to have jurisdiction over affordable housing 
issues in the first instance has already expedited reform for affordable housing accommodations. 
Part II: Background 
 
 Historically, the law has made exclusionary conduct in the housing context possible.11  
Until the 1940s, private exclusion was legally accepted to allow for patterns of segregation and 
housing discrimination.12  Even mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration 
contained racial restrictions.13  Discernibly, these outright restrictions were eventually ruled 
unconstitutional.14  However, localities have the “sovereign power to regulate land use as they see 
fit,” which enables institutional discrimination to endure through less ostensible means.15  For 
example, municipalities effectively exclude others by offering little dwelling units for affordable 
to low-income people. 16  They also do so “by using local land-use regulatory ordinances that raise 
the cost of other housing beyond their [low income people’s] reach.”17  Laws can be a proxy for 
substantial barriers, for example, through “minimum lot and room sizes, setback rules, and 
discretionary procedures for multifamily developments.”18     
                                                     
11 CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES, 8 (1996). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.; Noelle Van Baaren, The Persistence of Exclusionary Zoning, RUTGERS CTR. FOR LAW IN METROPOLITAN 
EQUITY (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.clime.newark.rutgers.edu/publications/article/persistence-exclusionary-zoning. 
17 HAAR, supra note 11, at 8.  
18 Id.; see also Van Baaren, supra note 16 (explaining how local zoning ordinance limit the supply of housing to 
increase the municipality’s desirability and raise the price of residential accesses to the area.  Van Baaren explains 
local governments’ objectives as follows: “Through this practice, municipal governments are able to accomplish two 
distinct but interrelated objectives: (1) they can take advantage of the benefits of regional development without 
having to bear the burdens of such development; and (2) they can maintain themselves as enclaves of affluence.”). 
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 Nevertheless, markedly, in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the practice 
of exclusionary zoning in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 
(Mount Laurel I).19  The revolutionary decision declared that every “developing municipality” has 
a state constitutional obligation under both substantive due process and equal protection, in 
addition to the state’s inherent police powers, to provide a realistic opportunity to afford housing 
for all people.20  Accordingly, it set the precedent that developing municipalities have an 
affirmative duty to provide for their “fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income 
housing.”21 
 Though innovative, Mount Laurel I did not develop remedies or guidelines to implement 
its mandate.  Rather, it relied on voluntary municipal compliance, reasoning that, “[t]he 
municipality should first have full opportunity to itself act without judicial supervision.”22  Yet, it 
notably encouraged the state legislature to aid in preventing exclusionary zoning at the local level 
by authorizing regional zoning, or at least regulation of those land use ordinances with a substantial 
impact by an agency beyond the local municipality.23  
 Despite the court’s groundbreaking decision, local municipalities largely ignored the 
mandate.24  Its lack of enforcement procedures led to little change.25  Thus, the New Jersey 
                                                     
19 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75. The decision resulted from a lawsuit brought by the Southern Burlington 
County NAACP on behalf of low-income African-American residents of Mount Laurel Township, who were not 
afforded the opportunity to build decent housing to replace the run-down homes in which they lived.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 192. 
22 Id.    
23 Id. at 189 & n.22. 
24 Henry L. Kent-Smith, The Council on Affordable Housing and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will the Council 
Succeed? 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987). (“Overall, the supreme court’s reliance on goodwill efforts and 
voluntary compliance meant no low cost housing.”).     
25 See id. at 953 (“Prior to the Mount Laurel II decision, little legislative action was taken towards effectuating the 
constitutional obligation set forth in the original Mount Laurel decision.  In fact, some of the earliest legislative 
actions were proposed constitutional amendments to overrule this decision.  These amendments redefined the Article 
I guarantees making them inapplicable to land use ordinances which may have indirect economic effects on low and 
moderate income housing opportunities.”); Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30, 32 (1988) (“While hailed as a case which could transform land-use 
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Supreme Court consolidated six cases concerning the issues surrounding the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine into a trial that resulted in what has been coined Mount Laurel II.26  In Mount Laurel II, 
aggravated by “widespread non-compliance,” the court expressly reaffirmed Mount Laurel I and 
authorized substantial remedies to “put some steel into [the Mount Laurel] doctrine.”27  
Particularly, instead of applying the doctrine to “developing” municipalities as it did in Mount 
Laurel I, the Court adopted the State Development Guide Plan as a method of discerning “growth 
areas” where the Mount Laurel mandate would apply.28  Furthermore, in an effort to promote a 
consistent and expedited system, it established a procedure by which three specially selected 
judges would hear all future Mount Laurel litigation.29  The judges would assess “fair share” for 
their regions, oversee challenges and development, and have the authority to invoke enforcement 
measures for noncompliant municipalities.30  Significantly, the court also approved a “builder’s 
remedy,” in which developers could receive direct approval from the court to build developments 
that included a reasonable share of affordable housing, if they successfully sued the municipalities 
with exclusionary zoning ordinances that rejected the developments.31   
 In adopting these extensive remedial measures, the court noted that while it prefers 
legislative to judicial action in the field, the inaction of the legislative and executive branches 
essentially left it no choice but to “give meaning to the constitutional doctrine” through its “own 
devices.”32  In other words, if the legislative body would not take action to enforce constitutional 
                                                     
law, eight years later little had changed.”); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay, 15 
N.J. REP. 21 (Oct. 1985) (“Looking back in 1983, eight years after the original [Mount Laurel] decision, it seemed 
clear that little lower-income housing had actually been built as a result of the Mount Laurel ruling, and not a single 
unit in Mount Laurel Township itself.”). 
26 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 158. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 158. 
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rights, the judiciary would.  The fact that the legislature could not reach accord to devise an 
effective enforcement mechanism was no longer an excuse.33   
 The court’s controversial decision mustered up both praise and resistance, generated over 
one hundred lawsuits, and most significantly, prompted the executive and legislative branches to 
act.34  In 1985, in order to preserve municipal home rule and to keep the judiciary away from 
implementing the Mount Laurel mandate, the legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act.35  The FHA 
created a state agency, known as the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), which was granted 
broad authority to assess and determine affordable housing obligations.36  Its purpose was to serve 
as “an optional administrative alternative to litigating constitutional compliance through civil 
exclusionary zoning actions.”37 
 COAH would be required to: (1) enact regulations that establish and update statewide 
affordable housing need; (2) assign each municipality an affordable housing obligation for its 
                                                     
 
33 Id. (explaining that the court’s intervention was attributable in part to “the enormous difficulty of achieving a 
political consensus that might lead to significant legislation enforcing the constitutional mandate better than [the 
court] can, legislation that might completely remove [the court] from those controversies.”); see also Paula A. 
Franzese, Mount Laurel and the Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure? 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 59, 67-68 (1991) 
(“Recognizing that the sore absence of political consensus posed a formidable obstacle to the passage of responsive 
legislation, the court concluded that enforcement of the constitutional rights at stake could not await a supporting 
popular concordance.”). 
34 Corey Klein, Re-Examining the Mount Laurel Doctrine After the Demise of the Council on Affordable Housing: A 
Critique of the Builder’s Remedy and Voluntary Municipal Compliance, SETON HALL L. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
PAPER, 1, 7 (2012), http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/123; see also Thomas Daniel McCloskey, 
Animal House Re-Lived: A Depiction of New Jersey’s Current Affordable Housing Landscape, IN THE ZONE (Feb. 
2009), http://www.foxrothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/inthezone_feb09_animalhouse.pdf. (“A rash of such 
suits were brought in the wake of Mt. Laurel II, prompting fears by municipalities that the courts would be dictating 
to them how and where residential developments (with and without affordable housing) would be implemented.”)  
35 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2013); Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 937 & n.62 (“The concept of 
municipal Home Rule directly opposes the regional fair share allocation of low and moderate income housing.  The 
term Home Rule originates from the Home Rule Act of 1917 . . . This act gave municipalities broad powers ‘over the 
internal affairs of such municipalities for local government.’”); McCloskey, supra note 34 (“Tensions immediately 
fomented and reached a feverish pitch between and among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of 
government over who was the more responsible, and equipped, agency of government to socially engineer housing 
policy and implement construction state-wide.”) 
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-307, -308; see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 4.   
37 Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 4. 
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designated region; and (3) identify the delivery techniques available to municipalities in addressing 
the assigned obligation.38  Of critical importance was COAH’s ability to assess a municipality’s 
fair share plan and housing element, and accordingly, grant or deny “substantive certification.”39  
In order to reward municipal compliance, the FHA protected towns that received substantive 
certification by granting a period during which the municipality’s implementing ordinances would 
enjoy a presumption of validity in any ensuing exclusionary zoning litigation.40  Furthermore, it 
generated the “exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement,” which provided a period of 
immunity from lawsuits to towns participating in the administrative process for demonstrating 
constitutional compliance.41   
 Despite criticism that the new Act institutionalized delay and did not provide enough 
recourse, in Mount Laurel III, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Fair Housing Act.42  While recognizing that the attack on the statute was substantial, the court 
dismissed it as pure speculation, and conveyed its preference for legislative action.43  It afforded 
the Legislature great deference, reasoning, “that a law is presumed to be constitutional” and found 
that any inadequacy with respect to the Council “must be close to a certainty” to be deemed 
unconstitutional.44  Moreover, the court clarified that in the earlier Mount Laurel cases, it was not 
sheer delays alone that necessitated judicial intervention, but rather, “the total disregard by 
municipalities of the judiciary’s attempts to enforce the obligation, and the interminable delay 
where litigation was in process.”45  The unanimous decision thus transferred jurisdiction of all 
                                                     
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307 to -308; 313 to -317; see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 7-8.   
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 21; Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 945; see also Franzese, supra note 25, at 40. 
43 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 43; Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 945; see also Franzese, supra note 25, at 40.  
44 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 43-45.  
45 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 41. The Court also rejected the argument that the freeze on builder’s remedies was 
part of the constitutional obligation. Id. at 42. 
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pending litigation to the Council.46  However, the court warned that if the legislature failed to 
accomplish its constitutional obligation, the judiciary would have no choice but to re-enter the 
scene and assure constitutional compliance.47  
 The system established worked somewhat well through the year 2000.48  About half of 
New Jersey’s local governments had submitted plans for COAH by the year 2001, and those, along 
with an additional sixty-eight, had completed or were beginning construction of about 29,000 low 
and moderate income housing units.49  Moreover, about 11,000 units were bought and occupied 
by low and moderate income households at this time.50  However, COAH’s shortcomings quickly 
proved the system ineffective, and a lack of political consensus regarding the mandate allowed, if 
not enabled, local noncompliance.51  Inaction on the part of the legislative and executive branches 
thus allowed history to repeat itself, and on March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
fulfilled its promise of Mount Laurel II and re-entered the affordable housing scene in what is now 
deemed “Mount Laurel IV.”52  The unanimous decision rendered COAH “moribund,” and just like 
in Mount Laurel II, transferred jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues to 
specially selected judges as the first forum for redress.53  This has prompted the floodgates to open 
with litigation.     
 
                                                     
46 Id. at 26.  
47 Id. at 23 (noting, “If . .  . the Act . . . achieves nothing but delay, the judiciary will be forced to resume its 
appropriate role.” “[n]o one should assume that our exercise of comity today signals a weakening of our resolve to 
enforce the constitutional rights of New Jersey’s lower income citizens.”). 
48 Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851 (2011); see also Eamonn K. Bakewell, Foreclosure of a Dream: The Impact of the 
Council on Affordable Housing’s New Regulations on the Constitutional Duty to Provide Affordable Housing in 
New Jersey, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 313-14 & n.30 (2005).  
49 Mallach, supra note 48, at 851. 
50 Id.   
51 Id.; Bakewell, supra note 48 at 316 (“Unfortunately, the regulations are rife with loopholes that would allow smart 
municipalities to completely avoid their Mount Laurel obligations.”); Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18. 
52Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 1. 
53 Id. at 5.  
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Part III: Inaction and Lack of Political Consensus Leads to Judicial Intervention 
In 2015, the judiciary was ultimately forced to re-enter the fray and render COAH 
“moribund” as a direct result of not only COAH’s own flaws, but a lack of political accord that 
ultimately facilitated abrogation of the Mount Laurel mandate at the local level.54  Despite 
COAH’s initial successes, embedded within the agency were loopholes that allowed townships to 
avoid their affordable housing obligations.55  The legislative and executive branches of the State’s 
government, however, simply did not address these shortcomings.56  Rather, clashing opinions 
concerning the Mount Laurel Mandate at its very core funneled conflicting decisions made by 
these branches.57  Ultimately, the same tensions amongst the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches that led to COAH’s creation also led to its demise, necessitating intense judicial 
intervention all over again, thirty years later. 
A. COAH’s Faults  
The system set up by COAH ultimately had its own faults that necessitated judicial 
intervention.  In 1987, the Council first adopted specific rules for determining a municipality’s 
affordable housing obligation known as the First Round Rules.58  In 1993, the Second Round Rules 
were adopted, which were similar to the first, but took into account changes in census data.59  The 
rules “applied a complex formula that took into account vacant land area, employment growth, 
and income distribution to come up with a firm, and sometimes seemingly highly arbitrary number 
for each municipality.”60  While the criteria set out by COAH was inherently designed to address 
                                                     
54 Id. 
55 Id.; see also Bakewell, supra note 48, at 321-22; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18.  
56 See generally Mallach, supra note 48.   
57 Id. 
58 See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2007); see also Klein, supra note 
34, at 8.  
59 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25.; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 8. 
60 Mallach, supra note 48 at 850-51. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25. 
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a municipality’s need for affordable housing, the rules had various “loopholes” that prevented 
inclusion.61   
Particularly, under the rules, municipalities could reduce the number of affordable housing 
units they were required to provide through the use of “credits.”62  In addition, up to twenty-five 
percent of a municipality’s required affordable housing could be satisfied through age-restrictive 
affordable housing.63  Moreover, communities could make use of a “Regional Contribution 
Agreement” (RCA) in which they could transfer up to fifty percent of their fair share to another 
community within the region through an agreement.64  Essentially, with an RCA, municipalities 
were “sending communities and receiving communities.”65  Cash typically changed hands between 
the sender and the receiver, with the sender being a suburban community and the receiver usually 
an urban center.66  
As time went on, as a result of these leniencies, many felt as though COAH became 
increasingly bureaucratic and not as concerned about the housing needs of low-income people.67  
Its amenability combined with inaction led to a downward spiral.68  The promulgation of Third 
Round Rules was due in 1999—however, when the Second Round Rules expired, COAH had not 
proposed new regulations.69  By 2004, the Appellate Division stated that COAH’s delay frustrated 
                                                     
61 Bakewell, supra note 48, at 321-22; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18.  
62 N.J.A.C. 9:93-2.14, -3.2; see also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25. (Explaining that 
in particular, COAH permitted credits and adjustments to reduce a municipalities fair share for affordable housing 
constructed between 1980 and 1986, for substantial compliance, and “for municipalities that lacked sufficient vacant 
land or did not have access to water and sewer.”)   
63 N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.15. In other words, by providing senior housing units could satisfy affordable housing 
obligations. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25.  
64 N.J.S.A. § 52:27D-312. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 23. 
65 Franzese, supra note 33, at 72. 
66 Id. 
67 Mallach, supra note 48, at 851; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17. 
68 Id. 
69 See 31 N.J.R. 1480 (June 7, 1999) (noting that second-round obligations expired on June 6, 1999); see also Mount 
Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8.  
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the public policies embodied by the Mount Laurel cases.70  COAH finally adopted a set of Third 
Round Rules on December 20, 2004, five years after the end of the previous round.71  In contrast 
to the prior rules, the new rules relied upon a municipality’s “growth share,” as opposed to a fixed 
obligation.72  This meant that municipalities had to provide affordable units “only to the extent that 
market rate housing and non-residential growth took place.”73  The new methodology was highly 
criticized for deterring municipalities from expanding, since under the new regulations, housing 
obligations were determined by the amount of homes and jobs created.74  Moreover, the new rules 
were scrutinized because they allowed one half of the affordable housing obligations to be satisfied 
through RCAs and the other half through age-restrictive zoning.75 
The flaws in COAH’s own rules were simply not addressed by the Council until the 
judiciary was forced to enter the scene in 2007.  Opposition from both developers and housing 
advocates, along with the New Jersey Builders Association, brought suit to invalidate the Third 
Round Rules.76  On January 25, 2007, the Appellate Division affirmed portions of COAH’s 
proposed methodology, but invalidated other aspects of the Third Round Rules.77  These 
invalidated aspects included the “growth share” principle and others methods by which COAH 
reduced municipal housing obligations, on constitutional and other grounds.78      
                                                     
70 In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91, 372 N.J. Super. 61, 95-96, 855 A.2d 582 (App. Div. 2004), cert. 
denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005); see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8. 
71 Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8. 
72 Id. at 23. E.g., Bakewell, supra note 48 at 320-29 (providing a detailed description of the Third Round Rules).  
73 Mallach, supra note 48 at 851.  
74 Bakewell, supra note 48 at 320-21 (“There are both strong advocates and harsh critics of the New Third Round 
Numbers.  The criticisms focus on the fact that there are so many loopholes in the new third round numbers that 
enable clever municipalities to effectively avoid the Mount Laurel obligation."). 
75 Id. One major criticism of allowing age restrictive zoning to satisfy affordable housing obligations is that it 
discriminates against low-income families with children. Id. at 323. 
76 Id.  
77 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 86-87.  
78 Id. at 88. See also McCloskey, supra note 34 (stating that judicial intervention in the process invalidated COAH’s 
third rounds “as having been, in material part, defective and trumped-up in such a way that, the Appellate Division 
concluded, recklessly if not deliberately underestimated the affordable housing need state-wide and over-stated the 
successes of municipal compliance with affordable housing obligations.”) 
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Yet, the problematic rules remained for quite some time thereafter.  Thus, efforts to truly 
enforce the Mount Laurel mandate moved at a glacial pace.  It was not until after the Appellate 
Division granted COAH two extensions, that COAH promulgated revised rules in 2008.79  These 
rules maintained a form of the “growth share” methodology, but removed many of the credits and 
other concerns of the prior rules, and more than doubled the total local fair share obligation.80  
However, the delay in their creation simply worsened the public’s perception of the Mount 
Laurel’s mandate.  Specifically, it frustrated those municipalities that already spent time and 
money to meet the requirements of the prior rules in good faith, but now fell out of compliance.81 
 B. State Government Inaction & Lack of Political Consensus  
Following the adoption of the revised Third Round Rules a slew of contradictory decisions 
concerning the Mount Laurel mandate by both the executive and legislative branches followed.  
Independent from COAH’s promulgation of its revised Third Round Rules that became effective 
on June 2, 2008, and while COAH’s further amendments had been proposed, on July 17, 2008, 
Governor Corzine enacted new COAH-reform legislation, P.L. 2008, c. 46, which updated the 
prior Act.82  It was driven by Assembly Speaker Joe Roberts, who was newly elected at the time.83 
The legislation amended the New Jersey Fair Housing Act.84  It added a new section to the 
FHA known as the “State-wide Non-Residential Development Fee Act” and took effect 
immediately upon its enactment by Governor Corzine on July 17, 2008.85  The Amendment also 
                                                     
79 N.J.R. 237(a) (Jan. 22, 2008); 40 N.J.R. 515(a) (Jan. 22, 2008); see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8. 
80 See Mallach, supra note 48, at 853. 
81 Id. 
82 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2; McCloskey, supra note 34 (describing the new Act, P.L. 2008, c. 46, which 
“took the form of Assembly Bill 500/Senate Bill 1783 – more commonly known and referred to as the ‘Roberts’ 
Bill’ that had been passed by the State Assembly on June 16, 2008, and State Senate on June 23, 2008.”) 
83 Mallach, supra note 48, at 854. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
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abolished RCAs and made other changes to law concerning affordable housing.86  Particularly, it 
provided that COAH may authorize a municipality to impose and collect development fees from 
developers of residential property, but provided that the municipality may not spend or commit to 
spend any of the fees without first obtaining COAH’s approval of the expenditure.87  Moreover, it 
mandated COAH to promulgate regulations regarding the establishment, administration, and 
enforcement of the expenditure of affordable housing development fees by municipalities.88   
Of critical significance, the Amendment also added that any developer fees collected, but 
not committed for expenditure within four years from the date of the collection, would be required 
by the council to revert the remaining unspent balance at the end of the four-year period to the 
state’s “New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund,” to be used in the housing region of the 
transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that fund.89  Shortly thereafter, in 2008, 
COAH’s then-Executive Director wrote to all New Jersey mayors explaining the provisions and 
noting that COAH was authorized to promulgate regulations regarding the expenditure of 
development fees in the municipal trust funds.90  However, this never transpired, despite the 
                                                     
86 Id.   
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(a) (stating first that COAH “may authorize a municipality that has petitioned 
for substantive certification . . . to impose and collect development fees from developers of residential property” and 
second, that “[a] municipality may not spend or commit to spend any affordable housing development fees . . . 
without first obtaining [COAH’s] approval of the expenditure”); see also In re Failure of COAH to Adopt Trust 
Fund Regulations, 440 N.J. Super. 220, 223 (App. Div. 2015) [hereinafter In re Failure of COAH].  
88 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(d) (requiring COAH to “promulgate regulations regarding the establishment, 
administration and enforcement of the expenditure of affordable housing development fees by municipalities”); see 
also In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 223. 
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(d) (providing that “[a] municipality that fails to commit to expend the balance 
required in the development fee trust fund by the time set forth in this section shall be required by the council to 
transfer the remaining unspent balance at the end of the four-year period to the ‘New Jersey Affordable Housing 
Trust Fund,’ . . . to be used in the housing region of the transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that 
fund.)”; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(b) (declaring, in part “[a] municipality that fails to commit to expend the 
amounts collected pursuant to this section within the timeframes established shall be required to transfer any 
unexpended revenue collected pursuant to subsection a. of this section to the ‘New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust 
Fund,’ . . . to be used within the same housing region for authorized purposes of that fund, in accordance with 
regulations promulgated by the council”); see also In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 224.   
90 In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 224. 
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Amendment’s mandate that COAH do so.91  The inaction thus added to the uncertainty concerning 
affordable housing obligations.  Consequently, by this point, COAH’s credibility had begun to 
decrease, as delays on the part of COAH continued to aggravate local governments.92   
Moreover, in 2008, confusion further spiraled when Governor Corzine altered the 
constitutional requirements of Mount Laurel, ignoring distinctions drawn by the Legislature in the 
Highlands Act.93  Specifically, the Governor ratified the Highlands Regional Master Plan and 
issued “Executive Order 114,” aimed at issues relating to the eighty-eight northern New Jersey 
municipalities located in the Highlands region.94  Executive Order 114 “directed that COAH’s 
calculations of affordable housing obligations of municipalities be adjusted downwards as 
necessary to ensure consistency with the Highlands Regional Master Plan” even though the 
Highlands Region, by statute, was already divided in to two distinct areas: the “Preservation Area” 
and the “Planning Area.”95  The Governor’s mandate was officially implemented on November 4, 
2008 and allowed conforming Highlands Region municipalities to have their “COAH Third Round 
affordable housing regulations adjusted to ensure that the Regions’ water and other resources were 
protected.”96  
                                                     
91 Id. 
92 Mallach, supra note 48, at 854-55. 
93 McCloskey, supra note 34; see also Memorandum of Understanding Among the Highlands Water Protection And 
Planning Council, The New Jersey State Planning Commission, and the Office of Smart Growth, NEW JERSEY 
HIGHLANDS COUNCIL, http://www.nj.gov/state/planning/docs/highlands_mou_2007.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) 
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]. In 2001, the state plan designated the New Jersey Highlands Region a 
Special Resource Area in New Jersey based upon its unique characteristics and resources.  Accordingly, it enacted 
the Highlands Act in 2004, which recognized the Highlands Region as an essential of exceptional natural resources, 
and created a bifurcated system for municipal and county conformance with the Regional Master Plan (RMP) that 
consists of a “preservation area” and a “planning area.” Id. at 1-2. 
94 Id. 
95 McCloskey, supra note 34. 
96 Id. Executive Order 114 was ultimately implemented by a Memorandum of Understanding between the Highlands 
Council and COAH. Each conforming municipality’s obligation would be determined by a local build-out analysis 
to be performed in accordance with the Highland Regional Master Plan and “up to 50 percent of a municipality’s 
affordable housing obligation could be shared with other willing municipalities in the Highlands Region in order to 
conserve environmentally sensitive lands or to take advantage of transportation hubs or existing infrastructure.” Id. 
See also Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 93. 
 16 
While Governor Corzine’s Executive Order enabled protection of the Highlands Region’s 
resources, it triggered the issuance of a “scare resource restraint” (“the restraint”) by COAH merely 
one week later, which further rattled political accord with respect to affordable housing 
obligations.97  The restraint effectively stopped all construction that did not include affordable 
units in all Highlands towns under its control.98  It was deemed to apply even to those towns in the 
Highlands Region “Planning Area,” where compliance with the Regional Master Plan is 
voluntary.99  Therefore, the restraint had a significant effect on development efforts.  Director of 
the Sierra Club of the New Jersey, Jeff TiFittel, attempted to justify the wide sweeping restraint, 
and stated that his organization supported the order, saying, “[w]e felt it would be the one way to 
make sure the affordable housing got built, and the towns couldn't play games. . . . Without the 
order, we worried that towns would approve luxury housing or box stores and say they had no 
room left for affordable housing, leading developers to sue and threaten the environmental 
protections of the Highlands Act.”100  In other words, the restraint was an attempt to prevent towns 
from quickly constructing in areas with scarce room for development, to exploit Executive Order 
114 and avert affordable housing obligations.  However, the decision ultimately aggravated 
political unanimity and led to greater delay in affordable housing efforts, since COAH arguably 
did not provide proper legal notice nor comply with its own rules or procedures.101  The sentiment 
was that COAH was essentially “shutting down the planning and zoning boards of the 72 affected 
                                                     
97 McCloskey, supra note 34.  
98 Id. (The towns affected included “72 of the 88 municipalities in the Highlands Region, including 24 of Morris 
County’s 32 municipalities.”). 
99 Id. 
100 Paula Saha, State Approves Affordable Housing Rules for 72 Highlands Towns, NJ.COM (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/11/state_approves_affordable_hous.html.   
101 McCloskey, supra note 34.  
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Highlands Region towns for the next 4-5 years.”102  It was thus viewed as an unjustified means of 
achieving nothing but deferral, and local governments’ aggravation with COAH intensified.103     
 As this controversy took place, municipalities continued to wait on COAH to provide a 
framework for the expenditure of housing development fees.  However, during the wait, legislation 
to abolish COAH was introduced by the Republican minority in the New Jersey Legislature in 
early 2009.104  By January 19, 2010, Senate Bill 1 was introduced to abolish COAH.105  The bill 
was amended a number of times over the months to come.106  Around this time, at the executive 
level, in February 2010, newly elected Governor Christie issued Executive Order No. 12, which 
created the Housing Opportunity Task Force.107  He directed the task force to review existing 
affordable housing laws and regulations, assess “the continued existence of COAH,” and issue a 
report in 90 days, staying any pending COAH proceedings until the task force submitted its 
report.108  In its report issued March 19, 2010, the task force concluded that in “the 25 years since 
its creation, COAH has failed to recognize the significant changes in New Jersey environmental 
awareness, transportation, population trends, and the economic climate.”109  The Task Force 
determined that COAH was “irrevocably broken” and proposed a new model for affordable 
                                                     
102 Id. 
103 Id. (McCloskey explains, “One highly respected, prominent land use lawyer noted that ‘This was a very irregular 
way to proceed . . . . I have a bunch of hearings scheduled in the next few weeks, and I’m not sure if the planning 
boards are going to let them go forward . . . .  We might be talking about a couple of years of delay if the courts 
don't step in and say this was not required, this was not justified.’”). 
104 Id. Although this legislation was unsuccessful, around the same time, soon to be Governor Chris Christie 
announced, “If I am governor, I will gut COAH and I will put an end to it.” Mallach, supra note 48, at 855. 
105 See S. 1,, 214th Leg. (N.J. Jan. 19, 2010); see also In re Abolition of Council on Affordable Housing, 424 N.J. 
Super. 410, 438 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d as modified, 214 N.J. 444, 452 (2013) [hereinafter In re Abolition]; see also 
Mallach, supra note 48, at 856 (Mallach describes, S-1, stating, “While the bill would have given the State Planning 
Commission some of COAH’s ministerial responsibilities, the Commission would neither set fair share numbers nor 
approve municipal plans. Under S-1, municipalities could choose between adopting a housing plan embodying a 
self-determined fair share goal or imposing a twenty percent affordable housing set-aside on all new development”). 
106 In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 452; see, e.g., S. Comm. Substitute for S. Comm. Substitute for S. 1, 214th Leg. (N.J. 
June, 3, 2010); S. Comm. Substitute for S. Comm. Substitute for S. 1 [First Reprint], 214 th Leg. (N.J. Dec. 10, 
2010). 
107 See 42 N.J.R. 659(a) (Mar. 15, 2010); see also In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 451. 
108 In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 451.  
109 Id. at 452. 
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housing policy.110  Thereafter, although COAH’s statutory responsibilities remained unchanged, 
the council was carefully monitored by the Governor’s office.111  As a result, it effectively 
remained latent.  This ultimately had a devastating effect on the implementation of affordable 
housing throughout the state, because COAH took few, if any, significant actions.112 
The lack of unity amongst the legislature became further apparent by June 2010, when one 
version of the Senate 1 Bill passed the Senate, but did not reach enough support in the Assembly.113  
However, during the summer and fall of 2010, “the Assembly leadership worked to craft an 
alternative bill that would occupy a middle ground among the many different advocates and 
interest groups.”114  A-3447, introduced in October 2010, attempted to provide a new method of 
carrying out the Mount Laurel mandate.115  Also, during this time, the Appellate Division 
concluded that COAH’s revised regulations suffered from “many of the same deficiencies as the 
original third round rules,” and invalidated considerable parts of the second set of COAH’s Third 
Round Rules.116  Again, the court remanded to COAH for the adoption of new Third Round Rules 
and “specifically directed COAH to use a methodology for determining prospective need similar 
to the methodologies used in the prior rounds.”117  Moreover, the court ordered COAH to complete 
the task within five months.118  However, this was ignored by Governor Christie’s 
administration.119 
                                                     
110 Id.  
111 Mallach, supra note 48, at 856. 
112 Id.   
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 857.  
115 Id. 
116 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 416 N.J. Super. 462, 471 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 221 N.J. 1,9 (2015). 
117 Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 9 (citing N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 416 N.J. Super at 487-511). 
118 Id.  
119 Mallach, supra note 48, at 856. 
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 Within three months, in January 2011, after some negotiations between the leadership of 
the two houses, with minor modifications, A-3447 was substituted for S-1, and the bill passed both 
houses on a party-line vote in January.120  Given COAH’s lack of successes, “it was now seen as 
politically impossible to give any state agency the authority to impose or enforce fair share 
obligations.”121  Nonetheless, A-3447 embraced a variation of the Massachusetts 40B model.122 
Although the legislature finally achieved accord concerning affordable housing reform at 
this point in time, the State still failed to achieve consensus at the executive level.  Despite the 
senate and assembly’s collaboration to achieve an agreement between the two houses, the 
Governor conditionally vetoed the bill on January 25, 2011.123  His veto delineated particular 
objections to the final bill and requested that it be amended to go back to the version that was 
passed in the Senate on June 10, 2010.124  However, since the legislature was not willing to adopt 
the changes demanded by the Governor, the bill died.125    
By February 7, 2011, the bill was withdrawn from consideration in the Legislature.126  It 
became evident that despite close attempts, the branches of state government could not agree on a 
new affordable housing policy, and as a result, the FHA and COAH remained intact.127  Since the 
Bill under consideration died, COAH remained the sole Mount Laurel enforcement mechanism. 
While the Appellate Division was willing to hold COAH accountable for its responsibilities, the 
                                                     
120 Id. at 858.         
121 Id. at 857 (Mallach explains that the task of forming the bill was difficult, as it was apparent that municipalities 
needed firm quantifiable targets to establish fair share obligations, but it was evident that no standard would be 
effective without higher-level enforcement.)  
122 Id. (“In order to provide a means of verifying the legitimacy of the municipal plan, without giving that 
responsibility to a state agency, the bill created a new category of ‘licensed housing compliance professional’ 
authorized to review and certify municipal housing plans.”); see A.B. 3447, 214 Leg., 1st Sess. (NJ 2010). 
123 In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 452.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 452-53.  
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executive branch treated it as a non-existent agency.128  In the meantime, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court had agreed to take the appeals from the appellate division ruling overturning the COAH 
rules.129  
 Roughly four months later, on June 29, 2011, the Governor issued Reorganization Plan No. 
001-2011 (“The Plan”).130  The Governor’s Plan sought to abolish COAH and transfer its powers, 
functions, and duties to Department of Community Affairs (DCA).131  Accordingly, it would 
replace the twelve-member Council with the DCA Commissioner.132  Around this time, in 2012, 
the DCA Commissioner, Richard E. Constable, prepared amendments that purported to define 
when funds were considered as expended or committed for expenditure, pursuant to the FHA’s 
2008 Amendment, after not being defined for four years.133  Such regulations were critical, since 
the 2008 Amendment had provided that the municipality could not “spend or commit to spend” 
any of the fees without first obtaining COAH’s approval of the expenditure, and added that any 
developer fees collected, but not committed, for expenditure within four years from the date of the 
collection would revert to the State’s “New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund,” to be used in 
the housing region of the transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that fund.134  
However, Commissioner Constable’s amendments were never adopted.135 Thus, in their absence, 
municipalities were left to their own devices to attempt to resolve the issue, but had little success.136  
                                                     
128 Mallach, supra note 48, at 856. 
129 See Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 1. 
130 In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 453; see 43 N.J.R. 1621(a) (Aug. 1, 2011).  
131In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 453. 
132 Id.  
133 In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super. at 224. 
134 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(a), supra note 87. 
135 In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super. at 224-25. 
136 Id. Among these methods included an entreaty by one group of municipalities to the Governor regarding the 
uncertainty presented by the status quo.  The municipalities argued that, without having a clear meaning of what 
exactly “commit to expend,” meant under the amendment, they would be forced to commit funds while remaining 
liable to compensate from their own funds if stricter guidelines were later devised by COAH. Id. at 225. 
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 Subsequently, on March 8, 2012, the Appellate Division invalidated Governor Christie’s 
Plan to abolish COAH after the Fair Share Housing Center challenged the Reorganization Plan in 
court.137  Shortly thereafter, despite the fact that legislation was passed that would have defined 
what funds were “committed,” and therefore ineligible for transfer to the State, on June 29, 2012, 
Christie vetoed the legislation and passed to extend the four-year deadline for two years.138  
Moreover, Christie line-item vetoed language in the 2012-2013 budget which would have defined 
what funds were “committed” and therefore ineligible for transfer to the State.139  With that 
proposed definitional language removed, the 2012 budget bill as signed into law provided that “an 
amount not to exceed $200,000,000 from the municipal affordable housing trust funds and 
transferred to the New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund as funds that have not been 
committed “shall be deposited in the General Fund as state revenue.”140  By July of 2012, the 
Christie administration attempted to usurp nearly $200 million in trust funds set aside for 
affordable housing, and place them into the State’s general fund.141  Hence, the millions of dollars 
in fees accumulated over years, specifically devoted to affordable housing efforts, could essentially 
be used for anything, but that for which they were intended.  However, ultimately, that effort failed 
because it was ruled unlawful by the Appellate Division.142   
C. The Judiciary Re-Enters the Fray  
In 2013, higher courts finally addressed issues relating to the lack of political consensus 
that enabled delays for affordable housing.143  Specifically, in July 10, 2013, the New Jersey 
                                                     
137 In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 453-54. 
138 In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super. at 225-26. The language of the legislation vetoed was adopted as L. 
2012, c. 18). Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 225.  
141 Kevin Walsh, Court Rules Trust Fund Raid Illegal, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/court-rules-trust-fund-raid-illegal/.        
142 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
143 See In re Abolition, 214 N.J. at 444.  
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Supreme Court affirmed that the governor could not unilaterally abolish COAH.144  Furthermore, 
two months later, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision 
invalidating the Third Round rules, and directed COAH to adopt new rules.145  Incorporating the 
Appellate Division’s five-month compliance period, the new rules were to be created by February 
26, 2014.146  However, the court granted COAH one last motion for an extension, subject to 
specific conditions and this date was pushed back even further.147 COAH was to adopt the Third 
Round Rules by October 22, and publish the notice in the November 17 edition of the New Jersey 
Register.148   
Ultimately, it became apparent that COAH did not approach this deadline.  Although the 
Board met and voted to propose COAH’s new Third Round Rules on April 30, 2014, the rules had 
not been provided to the Board until roughly twenty-four hours before the meeting.149  
Furthermore, its second meeting to vote on the proposed new Third Round Rules did not take place 
until October 20, 2014, merely two days before the court’s extended deadline.  At that meeting, 
the COAH members split 3-3 on the vote, and the Third Round Rules were thus never adopted by 
October 22 in accordance with the court's order.150   
As a result of COAH’s studied inaction, in March 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that there was no longer a legitimate basis to block access to the courts with 
respect to issues regarding the Mount Laurel mandate.151  Specifically, the court held that, “[t]he 
FHA’s exhaustion-of-administrative remedies requirement, which states off civil actions, is 
                                                     
144 Id. at 479. 
145 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 215 N.J. 578 (2013). 
146 See Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 9.   
147 Id. at 9-10. 
148 Id. at 10. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 5. 
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premised on the existence of a functioning agency, not a moribund one.”152  The court recognized 
that by failing to promulgate Third Round Rules after years of inaction, COAH was essentially 
dilapidated. Jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues, therefore, would return the 
courts as the first forum for redress.  Particularly, the court held, “[p]arties concerned about 
municipal compliance with constitutional affordable housing obligations are entitled to such 
access, and municipalities that believe they are constitutionally compliant or that are ready and 
willing to demonstrate such compliance should be able to secure declarations that their housing 
plans and implementing ordinances are presumptively valid in the event they later must defend 
against exclusionary zoning litigation.”153  Hence in an impartial fashion, the court was willing to 
accommodate both municipalities and affordable housing advocates alike.   
 In order to establish an orderly method by which proceedings could commence and to allow 
parties to prepare, the court delayed its order 120 days and established a transitional process.154  
Under the process, after the first 90 days, municipalities would have 30 days to file declaratory 
judgment actions before judges assigned in each vicinage.155  These declaratory judgment actions 
would allow the municipalities to request immunity from lawsuits if they had already achieved 
substantive certification, or already had “participating status” from COAH under the Third Round 
Rules before they were invalidated.156  The judges’ evaluation of a town’s plan could then result 
in what it referred to as “the town’s receipt of the judicial equivalent of substantive certification 
and accompanying protection as provided under the FHA.”157  On the other hand, if towns chose 
                                                     
152 See Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 5.   
153 Id. at 21-29. 
154 Id. There are approximately twenty-nine specially designated civil-division Mount Laurel judges, including 
backup Judges, serving the fifteen Vicinages in New Jersey.  No Vicinage has more than three assigned judges.  See 
Designated Mount Laurel Judges by Vicinage, NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/Designated_Mount_Laurel_Judges_Roster.pdf 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 5-6. 
157 Id. at 6.  
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not to file such actions within the time frame set by the New Jersey Supreme Court, an action could 
be brought by a party against that municipality to determine whether its housing plan satisfied the 
Mount Laurel mandate.158  The court thus made clear that any municipalities noncompliant with 
the deadlines set forth would have clear consequences.  Respectively, the following month, the 
Appellate Division further clarified that the Christie administration could not take housing trust 
funds and place them in the State’s general fund.159 
Part IV: Why the Mount Laurel IV Decision Was Necessary 
Ultimately, the Mount Laurel IV decision terminating any requirement to exhaust 
administrative remedies before COAH for Mount Laurel compliance issues was necessary to serve 
as an impetus for reform and to put an end to delays in the provision of affordable housing 
opportunities throughout the State.  It is evident that without political consensus and reform 
legislation, affordable housing obligations are simply ignored absent court orders pushing the 
process along.  Inconsistencies at the State government level enable municipalities to employ pre-
textual methods to disregard the mandate.  This is because the absence of clear governing standards 
leaves local and county officials, respective in-house and outside professional staffs, litigators, 
developers, builders, planners, local government attorneys, zoning, land use, and planning 
attorneys, engineers, affordable housing advocates, and environmentalists with insufficient 
guidance concerning how best to comply with the Mount Laurel mandate.160  Such lack of guidance 
for all involved enables municipalities to exploit irregularities, rely on loopholes, and foster delay.  
Specifically, absent political consensus and strict enforcement mechanisms, localities can be 
creative in finding ways to avoid compliance, whether by routinely routinely requesting deadline 
                                                     
158 See Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 6.   
159 In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 220; see also Walsh, supra note 141.  
160 See McCloskey, supra note 34 (explaining the “whole host of representatives” that are “intimately involved in the 
affordable housing matrix”).  
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extensions, hiring attorneys and experts skilled in avoidance tactics, and using environmental 
preservation as a pre-text to skirt the Mount Laurel duty.  Now that the judiciary has established 
jurisdiction over Mount Laurel litigation in the first instance, those delay tactics are less likely to 
succeed.     
The present posture of allowing the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress until 
reform legislation is developed makes good sense.  Otherwise, municipalities can to easily skirt 
their affordable housing obligations by requesting extensions and adjournments.  The Township 
of Marlboro, for example, failed to act in good faith in the completion of its second-round 
obligations and in its submissions for third-round certification by fashioning deferrals for years on 
end.161  Particularly, the township fulfilled only about one-fifth of its 1019-unit second-round 
obligation by obtaining numerous postponements throughout COAH’s review process.162  
Moreover, during this time, Marlboro frequently shifted project sites to defer the process of 
erecting affordable housing.163  Although COAH attempted to resolve this issue, its enforcement 
was simply not effective.  For example, COAH confronted the municipality by demanding further 
information regarding its changes in affordable housing plans.164  However, the township was 
ultimately able to escape these demands by simply requesting further postponements through the 
                                                     
161 See In Re Marlboro Township, Monmouth County, Motion Seeking Accelerated Denial of Marlboro’s Third 
Round Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, A-0243-10T4, at *4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 
In Re Marlboro]. 
162 Id. at *5. The township had been creating delays since December of 1985, when Marlboro was granted a period 
of repose until 1991, which was later extended at its request to 1995.  Although the town included certain sites to 
address its second-round obligations, Marlboro later proposed to eliminate the sites and “[b]y the time it began to 
engage in COAH-moderated mediation of its third-round obligations, it was including proposals which would 
simultaneously satisfy its second-round obligations.”  Id. at *4-5. The Appellate Division ultimately held, “[n]ot 
only were the township’s third-round substantive proposals significantly flawed, but it also fell woefully short of 
fulfilling its second-round commitments.” Id. at *10-11. 
163 Id. at *5. 
164 Id.  
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administrative process.165  These extensions thus allowed Marlboro to perpetually postpone its 
Mount Laurel obligations. 
In addition, the frequent changes and inconsistencies at the state governmental level allow 
municipalities to avoid their obligations, because townships’ attorneys are able to use the lack of 
political consensus as a defense when townships are challenged for engaging in dilatory behavior.  
For example, when various developers filed a motion to dismiss Marlboro from COAH’s 
jurisdiction after years of noncompliance, the township not only opposed the application and 
requested additional extensions, but also attributed its delay to “factors beyond its control, such as 
the Governor’s executive order suspending COAH’s operations, appeals challenging the third-
round regulations, and the introduction of legislative proposals designed to alter the affordable 
housing laws.”166  While it was apparent that the municipality had no intention or drive to satisfy 
its affordable housing obligations, it was able to mask its failure to do so and gain more time by 
using the state government’s inaction to its advantage.167  
Moreover, the Mount Laurel IV decision was necessary, because without judicial 
intervention, municipalities can too easily create the illusion of compliance.  For example, a 
township could enact a set of ordinances that do make provision for affordable units, but never act 
upon those ordinances.  For instance, in 2011, the Fair Share Housing Center sued the Hoboken 
Zoning Board and four developers for failing to enforce a local housing ordinance with provisions 
that require residential developers to devote a certain percentage of new units for “working 
                                                     
165 Id.  
166 Id.   
167 Id. at *15. It was apparent that the township had no drive to comply with affordable housing obligations despite 
factors beyond its control since the township “did nothing to advance the completion of additional housing units.”  
The township never supplied COAH with supporting information that the Council requested regarding plans for 
which the township sought approval of.  Marlboro’s failure to supply COAH with this necessary supporting 
information was never justified nor explained, despite COAH’s repeated requests for the information.  
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families, seniors and those with disabilities.”168  The Appellate Division ultimately agreed with 
the Fair Share Housing Center and upheld the ordinance, which compelled developers in the city 
to make ten percent of new units affordable to lower-income families.  However, the decision was 
not rendered until July of 2015, roughly twenty-seven years after the ordinance was signed into 
law in 1988.169 
Furthermore, it is imperative to allow the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress, 
because in the midst of the political confusion surrounding the Mount Laurel doctrine, and absent 
reform legislation, municipalities can abuse proposals for environmental preservation efforts as a 
pretext to continue exclusionary practices.170  In Mount Laurel II, the court specifically held that 
“the Mount Laurel Doctrine will not restrict other measures, including large-lot and open area 
zoning, that would maintain its beauty and communal character.”171  The court thus implemented 
affordable housing obligations while accounting for environmental conservation proposals.  
However, one study revealed, “municipalities are targeting land able to accommodate higher-
density development in their preservation efforts, and that municipalities that preserve open space 
are also active in transferring away their affordable housing obligations.”172  This indicates that 
                                                     
168 Laura Denker, Appellate Court Upholds Hoboken Housing Ordinance: Ruling Means at Least 55 New Affordable 
Rentals, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER (Apr. 2015), http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/appellate-court-upholds-
hoboken-housing-ordinance-ruling-means-at-least-55-. (Explaining, “[t]he ordinance was meant to ensure that 
longtime Hoboken residents could continue to live in the city even as it developed and became a more expensive 
place to live.”); see Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of City of Hoboken, 441 N.J. Super. 483 
(App.Div. 2015) [hereinafter City of Hoboken].  
169 City of Hoboken, 441 N.J. at 491. (This decision overturned a lower court ruling that struck down the housing 
ordinance, holding that it violated New Jersey’s housing policies); see also Denker, supra note 168. (Fair Share 
Housing Center Executive Director Kevin Walsh declared, “[t]his unanimous decision [City of Hoboken] is a victory 
for working families – not only in Hoboken but also in fast-growing urban communities across New Jersey.”  He 
added, “[a]s expensive new luxury high-rises go up across New Jersey, the court today gave our cities crucial tools 
to ensure that no one is left behind by this continuing growth and everyone can enjoy the benefits of living in these 
thriving communities.”).   
170 See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.   
171 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 220.  
172  See Stephan Schmidt and Kurt Paulsen, Is Open Space Preservation a Form of Exclusionary Zoning? The 
Evolution of Municipal Open-Space Polities in New Jersey, 45 URB. AFF. REV. 92 (2009). 
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without strict oversight, and under relaxed “enforcement” regimes like COAH, towns can employ 
environmental preservation plans as a way to curtail affordable housing obligations.  In Toll Bros. 
v. Twp. Of W. Windsor, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision granting a builder’s remedy when a township established ordinances to set aside an 
excessive amount of common open and recreational space and the sites zoned for affordable 
housing had severe environmental constraints including “freshwater wetlands, freshwater wetlands 
buffers, and floodplain plain areas.”173  The township also set unduly expensive sewerage 
requirements that made development unlikely.174  Moreover, it did not authorize the building of 
modest one-family detached dwellings, or the building of modest one-family detached 
dwellings.175  The court found that the township failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for the 
development of affordable housing and did not built the units of affordable housing to which it 
committed.176   
Similarly, in Tomu Dev. Co. v. Borough of Carlstadt, zoning boards did not satisfy their 
affordable housing obligations arguing that the land had no realistic development potential.177  
However, the Appellate Division ultimately affirmed that the municipality could not even meet its 
burden of proving that the site for development was environmentally constrained or that 
construction would represent bad planning.178  It found that East Rutherford made no good faith 
                                                     
173 Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 529 (2002); see also 1-9 A Practical Guide To Winning Land 
Use Approvals and Permits § 9.05 (LexisNexis 2015) [hereinafter A Practical Guide]. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Tomu Dev. Co. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1996 (App.Div. Aug. 29, 2008)..The 
case involved three back-to-back appeals that arose from two consolidated “builder’s remedy” suits, alleging that the 
Borough of Carlstadt and the Borough of East Rutherford, and their zoning boards, engaged in exclusionary zoning 
and failed to meet their affordable housing obligations.   
178 Id. at *3. After the developer asserted that the land and infrastructure needed for affordable housing was scarce in 
the municipalities, the lower court had issued a “scare resources” order that restrained the municipalities from 
approving any new use of or access to scare resources without court approval, in order to assure that affordable 
housing might actually be built.  The land upon which the developer proposed to build affordable housing laid 
within the statutorily created Meadowlands District.  Id. at *8. 
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effort to submit a compliant housing element, as the site appeared to be one of the few remaining 
developable housing sites in the two municipalities.179  The Appellate Court also notably upheld 
the trial judge’s decision to, for the first time ever, create an additional new mechanism to ensure 
compliance by the defendant towns as an aide to its award of a “builder’s remedy.”180  Specifically, 
a new “‘Mt. Laurel Implementation Monitor’ was appointed by the court to perform pertinent 
zoning functions of the towns such as making land use development decisions for them, preparing 
housing elements and fair share plans and appearing before the NJMC on affordable housing 
applications.”181  All zoning ordinances in both Carlstadt and East Rutherford were suspended 
pending their compliance with the remedy.182   
While the court ultimately held in favor of the implementation of affordable housing in 
both Toll Bros. and Tomu Dev. Co., it is important to allow the judiciary to serve as the initial 
forum for redress until effective reform legislation can be passed.  Otherwise, attempts at securing 
compliance with the affordable housing mandate would be needlessly protracted.  For example, 
previously aggrieved developers had to comply with COAH’s own procedures before being 
granted judicial review.  Those procedures presented multiple opportunities for delay and 
obfuscation.  For instance, in In Re Marlboro, the court held, “COAH gave Marlboro years of 
opportunities to perfect its plans.  That Marlboro chose not to do so triggered the consequences it 
                                                     
179 Id. at *18. The lower court’s opinion thus stated that the land use regulations of the municipalities remained 
invalid and unconstitutional insofar as they continued past exclusionary practices and the Meadowlands Commission 
“implicitly fostered” those municipalities’ failures through its “benign neglect of the housing needs of the poor.” Id. 
at *3. 
180 Id. at *18. 
181 McCloskey, supra note 34; Tomu, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. at *10-11, 18.  The Appellate division rejected a 
challenge the the imposition of the “Mt. Laurel Implementation Monitor” and instead lauded the lower court’s 
innovation as “an inspired and appropriate exercise of the court’s judicial powers” that was “creative and insightful” 
and “intended to avoid collaboration between the municipalities and Meadowlands Commission that would continue 
the pattern of non-compliance.” Id. at *21-22. 
182 See Tomu, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *10-11.  
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now faces.”183  Although the court held that “Mount Laurel issues were best addressed before a 
judge, as Marlboro simply failed to engage in the alternative process in good faith,” it was not until 
many years later that the Court actually got to address the issue.184  These were years that could 
have been spent erecting affordable housing units for people in need. 
Moreover, this lengthy process deters people from pursuing litigation because the amount 
of time and money expended on such can be rendered worthless if the litigation us unsuccessful.  
For example, in Mount Olive Complex v. Township of Mount Olive, although Mount Laurel issues 
were finally dealt with before the judiciary, the court ultimately affirmed the denial of a builder’s 
remedy.185  The Appellate Division concluded that it did not appear that completion of the 
proposed project would significantly impact the availability of affordable housing in the 
township.186  Specifically, it affirmed that the developer was not a “major player” in an earlier 
settlement and could not demonstrate that Mount Olive’s land-use regulations failed to provide a 
realistic opportunity to satisfy its obligation at the time the developer brought its litigation.187  
Although the developer exhausted significant time and money to pursue litigation, its efforts were 
fruitless.  As a result, many of the aggrieved simply do not litigate.  John Mangin, an attorney who 
worked for the Fair Share Housing Development, explained that, “[s]uburban municipalities will 
baldly reject conforming applications for multifamily affordable development, knowing that 
applicants will most likely not be able to carry a property though a drawn-out legal battle.”188  
Furthermore, he states, “[a]nd while the remedy in a successful NIMBY suit is a blocked 
development, the remedy in a successful developer suit is typically the privilege of starting the 
                                                     
183 In Re Marlboro, A-0243-10T4, at *11-12. 
184 Id. at *12. The Appellate Division noted that for years, “Marlboro engaged in dilatory tactics throughout the 
application process.” Id. at *10.  
185 Mount Olive Complex v. Township of Mount Olive, 356 N.J. Super 500 (App. Div. 2003). 
186 Mount Olive Complex, 356 N.J. Super at 507; see also A Practical Guide, supra note 173.  
187 Mount Olive Complex, 356 N.J. Super. at 507-10. 
188 John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 101 n.53 (2014). 
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costly approvals process all over again.  Delay can kill projects outright if carry costs become too 
burdensome.   The developer loses the property or simply gives up.”189  Thus, from the perspective 
of developers, the costs of delay can simply outweigh any benefits of building affordable housing.  
Conversely, by terminating any requirement to first exhaust administrative remedies before 
COAH, the problem of delays in affordable housing can be averted.  The Mount Laurel IV decision 
serves not as a punishment, but rather, a means by which towns can demonstrate their 
constitutional compliance.190  Moreover, it acts as an impetus for reform in affordable housing 
legislation.  While the judiciary took control of Mount Laurel compliance issues, the court held, 
“nothing herein should be understood to prevent COAH from fulfilling its statutory mission to 
adopt constitutional rules to govern municipalities’ Third Round obligations in compliance with 
the FHA.”191  Nevertheless, until constitutional rules or more effective legislation is developed, 
the Mount Laurel IV decision has acted to end delays in the implementation of affordable housing. 
By allowing the judiciary to serve as a forum of initial redress, clearer guidelines regarding 
the Mount Laurel mandate have already emerged to avert postponement on the part of 
municipalities.  For example, within a few short months of the decision, in July of 2015, Superior 
Court Judge Douglas K. Wolfson clarified the steps that need to be taken by municipalities in order 
to comply with Mount Laurel.192  The decision provided a roadmap for compliance and illustrated 
                                                     
189 Id. at 101. The term NIMBY, which stands for “Not In My Backyard” is a characterization referring to people 
who oppose proposals for new developments because they perceive that the development will bring about something 
potentially dangerous, unpleasant, or unsightly in their neighborhood. 
190 See Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 23 (explaining that “it bears emphasizing that the process established is not 
intended to punish the towns represented before this Court, or those that are not represented but which are also in a 
position of unfortunate uncertainty due to COAH’s failure to maintain the viability of the administrative remedy.  
Our goal is to establish an avenue by which towns can demonstrate their constitutional compliance to the courts 
through submission of a housing plan and use of processes, where appropriate, that are similar to those which would 
have been available through COAH for the achievement of substantive certification.”). 
191 Id. at 6 (Furthermore, the court held, “[n]or should the action taken by this Court, in the face of COAH’s failure 
to fulfill its statutory mission, be regarded as impeding the Legislature from considering alternative statutory 
remedies to the present FHA.”).   
192 In the Matter of the Adoption of the Monroe Township Housing Element and Fair Share Plan and Implementing 
Ordinances, MID-L-3365-15, at *6 (Law Div. July 9, 2015) [hereinafter Monroe Township]; see also Kevin Walsh, 
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that the judiciary acts as an impartial referee when addressing affordable housing issues.  It allotted 
the municipality, Monroe Township, ample time to file a fair share plan while also setting a firm 
deadline of November 9, 2015.193  Moreover, it stressed that all interested parties would have the 
opportunity to be heard.  Accordingly, the Judge permitted a developer and the Fair Share Housing 
Center to participate in the lawsuit.194    
Furthermore, by giving specially assigned judges jurisdiction over all affordable housing 
litigation in the first instance, municipalities can no longer snub their affordable housing 
obligations by requesting extensions and adjournments.  The judicial branch has made clear that 
such attempts will no longer be tolerated.  For instance, even though Judge Wolfson’s decision 
clearly set out a roadmap for municipalities for filing a fair share plan, the Borough of Roselle 
Park nevertheless filed a motion to request that the five-month period begin on an undecided future 
date.195  However, this delay tactic was quickly eliminated.  When the FSHC opposed the request, 
it was able to quickly and efficiently obtain an order granting immunity and declaring that the five 
months would begin when the municipality filed in court. 196  
                                                     
Decision Provides Roadmap to Municipalities, Requires Fair Share Plans in 5 Months, FAIR SHARE HOUSING 
CENTER (July 9, 2015), http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/decision-provides-roadmap-to-municipalities-
requires-fair-share-plans-in-5-/.   
193 Monroe Township, MID-L-3365 at *6 (Judge Wolfson held, “I am satisfied that Monroe has made a good faith 
attempt to satisfy its affordable housing obligations, and hence, deserves immunity from exclusionary zoning 
actions, on the condition that it prepares and files its housing element and fair share plan within five months”). 
194 Id. at *9 (holding “while I am mindful of the Supreme Court’s clear mandate to adjudicate such actions as 
quickly as prudence and justice will allow, it is amply clear that the Court specifically contemplated, and in the case 
of FSHC, for example, directly encouraged, interested parties to weigh in on the extent and methods by which a 
given municipality proposed to fulfill tis affordable housing obligations”).    
195 See Kevin Walsh, Another Court Rules Five Months Starts from Filing of DJ Complaint, FAIR SHARE HOUSING 
CENTER (July 24, 2015), http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/another-court-rules-five-months-starts-from-filing-
of-dj-complaint/. 
196 See Walsh, supra note 195 (explaining “[t]he municipality sought to delay when the five-month period started, 
arguing that nine months was not enough time to prepare a fair share plan and that other proceedings had to happen 
first, all while declining to provide even a proposed timeframe for when those proceedings would happen”); see also 
In the Matter of the Application of the Borough of Roselle Park, County of Union, Order Maintaining and 
Reaffirming the Borough’s Immunity From Mount Laurel Lawsuits, UNN-L-2061-15, (Law. Div. July 24, 2015). 
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Moreover, by allowing the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress, Judges have 
been able to quickly make innovative decisions to promote the building of affordable housing.  
Particularly, in Middlesex County, Judge Wolfson continues to rapidly address Mount Laurel 
issues.  In September of 2015, for example, he held that municipalities “proceeding in good faith” 
to accomplish judicial consent of their affordable housing plans will have their housing trust funds 
safeguarded from state seizure.197  Since Monroe Township, collected over ten million dollars in 
its housing trust fund, the decision is likely to have a significant impact on future housing 
development projects.198   
In October of 2015, Judge Wolfson issued another noteworthy decision that accounted for 
the sixteen-year delay in the adoption of fair housing rules.199  The decision is binding on 
Middlesex County and follows an approach that divides the State’s housing need into two 
segments.200  Specifically, from 1999 to 2015, excess Prior Round credits can be applied so that 
affordable housing need from the 16-year gap is addressed first.201  The resulting need will then 
be phased in three ten-year cycles, over thirty years.202  Although, under the FHA, a municipality 
may be eligible for a one thousand unit cap limiting fair housing obligations, this determination 
would be made separately for the 2015-2025 segment, after any remaining excess Prior Round 
credits are applied.203  Thus, the longwinded sixteen-year delay in affordable housing is accounted 
                                                     
197 In the Matter of the Adoption of the Monroe Township Housing Element and Fair Share Plan and Implementing 
Ordinances, MID-L-3365-15, (Law. Div. Aug. 26, 2015); Laura Denker, Ruling by Judge Wolfson protects Monroe 
housing trust funds, sets process to build homes, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/ruling-by-judge-wolfson-protects-monroe-housing-trust-funds-sets-process-
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198 Denker, supra note 197.  
199 Laura Denker, Middlesex County decision addresses municipal cap issue, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/middlesex-county-decision-addresses-municipal-cap-issue/. 
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
203 Denker, supra note 199. 
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for.204   The decision, which is the first to address this issue, proves that the judiciary is committed 
to holding municipalities accountable for their Mount Laurel obligations.205 
Part V: Conclusion 
 
 Ultimately, despite the challenges it has faced, the Mount Laurel mandate remains a most 
hopeful mechanism by which to make real the promise of decent housing for all.206  It is evident, 
however, that the judiciary has its work cut out for it in arriving at stricter and more cohesive 
enforcement mechanisms than those set out by COAH.  Indeed, COAH and the coordinating 
branches object failure yielded inescapable the conclusion that the judiciary had to enter the fray.  
It will remain there until the legislative and executive branches can develop legislation that 
effectively addresses the affordable housing crisis.  Until then, however, the judicial branch is 
needed to compel relief that will unquestionably have a meaningful impact on affordable housing 
reform in New Jersey.  Today, New Jersey remains one of the most economically and racially 
segregated states in America notwithstanding the Mount Laurel mandate.207  The judiciary can 
spur meaningful change by implementing the spirit and letter of the affordable housing mandate.  
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